Politics were not boring this year, with three long-standing leaders leaving the stage: in the Gambia, President Yahya Jammeh initially refused to vacate the presidency after losing the elections. Concerted efforts on the part of ecowas and in particular Senegal forced him in January to leave the country. Angola’s President Eduardo dos Santos, after 38 years in power, made way in August for a successor of his choice, who introduced some unexpected corrective measures. Zimbabwe’s 93-year-old President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, in power since Independence in 1980, was unceremoniously dismissed in November in an intervention by the military. While the army decided his replacement, the generals remained in denial of all evidence that this was a coup. In contrast, the change in chairing the au Commission took place according to plan with no surprises.
Sudanese internal politics remained tense, both within the regime and in its relations with many sectors of society. Within the regime, President Omar al-Bashir announced the formation of a new government emerging from the ‘National Dialogue’. But the composition of and participants in this Government of National Accord (or Consensus) were far from representing a solid basis for peaceful political competition. Tensions also remained very high within many segments of society, particularly student movements and (armed) groups in peripheral regions. Hundreds of political prisoners remained in jail.
The Kingdom of Swaziland, ruled by King Mswati iii since 1986, remained a country with a small population of approximately 1.3 m people. With the highest rate of hiv/aids in the world, the people continued to experience severe food shortages, medical shortages and unemployment. The ongoing drought exacerbated the situation as it affected the agricultural and industrial sectors, further raising unemployment and poverty levels. Excessive use of force by the police continued to contravene human rights laws, and the welfare and protection of children came under the spotlight during the year. The reinstatement of the agoa trade agreement, together with renewed programme support from the eu, brought fresh hopes of increased trade and development.
President Magufuli, in his second year in office, ever more vigorously pursued an authoritarian leadership style that significantly narrowed the previously existing democratic space and curtailed critical public debate. The freedoms of assembly and of expression of opposition voices were frequently restricted by state authorities, political rallies were banned outside of election periods, many opposition politicians were repeatedly arrested, interrogated and intimidated, critical media were closely scrutinised and the state organs showed an increasing intolerance of any dissenting opinion. Despite a noticeable deterioration in the general political climate, the stability of the political system was not under threat and the dominant long-ruling ccm (‘Chama cha Mapinduzi’ / Revolutionary Party) was able to control all spheres of public life and still enjoyed the unwavering support of the majority of the population. Magufuli further consolidated his grip on the ccm, despite continued discontent within party ranks. On the surface, the situation in semi-autonomous Zanzibar remained relatively calm, but the long-standing confrontation between the ccm and the opposition cuf did not vanish. Neighbourly relations with Rwanda and Uganda were strengthened, amid minor disputes with Kenya over trade issues. Relations with Western aid donors became more strained over dissatisfaction with Magufuli’s erratic governance style, while cooperation with China was further intensified. Indicators of macroeconomic performance continued to be good, with a solid 7.1% gdp growth rate, but uncertainty over the government’s strategic orientation of stressing economic nationalism and continuing severe liquidity problems weakened private sector initiatives, raising worries about a looming economic slowdown.
The demand for political change, initiated by institutional and electoral reforms, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers to the Gnassingbé regime throughout the year. Civil society organisations and representatives of the Christian church supported the demands of the opposition. The notoriously divided opposition gathered new momentum from August, when the lead was taken by a hitherto hardly known opposition party and its charismatic leader, Tikpi Atchadam. He organised huge demonstrations by all 14 opposition parties in the second half of the year, which put the government increasingly under pressure. Foreign affairs were dominated by the impact of increased aid from the international donor community. Socio-economic affairs were marked by diminishing human development and economic freedom.
The aftermath of the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections having only just died down, Ugandans were already presented with a foreshadowing of the 2021 vote. An apparently personal initiative by an mp to scrap the constitutionally-enshrined age limit for the office of president was hotly debated. The plan led to public protest and violent scenes even in parliamentary chambers, but eventually became law. It provided an opportunity for the incumbent to extend his tenure for the foreseeable future. The already toxic political atmosphere deteriorated, with political opponents, civil society organisations and the media bearing the brunt. Uganda ended its military presence in the car, where remnants of a former Ugandan insurgency had taken refuge, but had largely withered away. On the whole, though, the regional environment hardly improved. Burundi’s crisis still loomed and Kenya had to come to terms with its botched elections. More South Sudanese fled to Uganda from internal strife in their homeland, and new refugees arrived from the drc. Uganda still exercised its role as a major regional player and continued to be held in high esteem in African and international fora. The economy experienced a slowdown of growth, but was basically sound. Various steps were taken towards the effective exploitation of the oil and natural gas deposits.
The sub-region witnessed significant developments in both the political and economic spheres. A number of governments embarked on economic reform programmes, which produced varying outcomes. Some of the results generated public outcry and other forms of civil action including protests, demonstrations and strike action. The general trend for opposition parties to come to power through elections continued and there were cases, as in the Gambia, where the opposition defeated the incumbent in relatively peaceful elections. However, there were concerns that change in government did not result in improved living conditions for the majority of the population.
Zambia became increasingly authoritarian under Patriotic Front (pf) President Edgar Lungu, who had been elected in a tightly contested presidential election in 2016. The runner-up, the United Party for National Development (upnd), engaged in a series of actions to challenge the validity of the results. The upnd saw 48 of its legislators suspended for boycotting Lungu’s state of the nation address and its leader, Hakainde Hichilema, was arrested on charges of treason after his motorcade allegedly blocked Lungu’s convoy. Independent media and civil society organisations were under pressure. A state of emergency was declared after several arson attacks. Lungu announced his intention to run in the 2021 elections and warned judges that blocking this would plunge the country into chaos. The economy performed better, underpinned by global economic recovery and higher demand for copper, the country’s key export. Stronger performance in the agricultural and mining sectors and higher electricity generation also contributed to the recovery. The Zambian kwacha stabilised against the dollar and inflation stood within the target. The cost of living increased. The country’s high risk of debt distress led the imf to put off a $ 1.3 bn loan deal. China continued to play a pivotal role in Zambia’s economic development trajectory. New bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with Southern African countries.
The removal of President Robert Mugabe in what has been dubbed a ‘soft coup’ was the biggest story of the year. Before Mugabe’s resignation, factional struggles in the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (zanu-pf), in which his wife, Grace Mugabe, was the key player, dominated the news for most of the year. Away from zanu-pf, the opposition remained divided and bickered constantly. While foreign relations with the usual friends remained good, there was very little improvement in relations with Western countries and multilateral lenders. Arguments about ‘illegal’ Western sanctions and human rights abuses persisted. Though some indicators improved, the economy showed no sign of significant improvement with cash shortages being one of the major challenges.